20 – The four hijacked flights

Anomalies and inconsistencies surround the flights themselves to the point where, considering the FBI’s failure to positively identify the airplane wreckage apparently recovered, it’s impossible to know that American Airlines flights 11 and 77 and United Airlines flights 175 and 93 crashed where we’re told they crashed at all.

Flight 11 (Boeing 767-223ER, registration N334AA, flying from Logan Airport in Boston to Los Angeles International Airport, but allegedly hit WTC 1 at 8:45am)

Flight 175 (Boeing 767-222, registration N612UA, flying from Logan Airport in Boston to Los Angeles International Airport, allegedly hit WTC 2 at 9:03am)

Flight 77 (Boeing 757-223, registration N644AA, flying from Washington Dulles International in Virginia, to Los Angeles, allegedly hit Pentagon at 9:37am)

Flight 93 (Boeing 757-200, registration N591UA, flying from Newark Intl Airport in New Jersey, to San Francisco Intl Airport in California, but allegedly crashed in a field in Pennsylvania at 10:03-10:10am)

We are told the four black boxes from flights 11 and 175, which allegedly hit the twin towers, were not recovered – an extremely rare occurence considering that they are built to withstand anything, and bank cards and passports belonging to the passengers and hijackers apparently survived as handy evidence that it was indeed their planes that crashed. (Other than those lost in oceans, large lakes, and inaccessible mountain locations, only one other black box in history has not been found.) However, two rescue workers say they helped find the boxes, and an anonymous employee of the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) admits that the organisation worked on it. So why are the black boxes being hidden?

The aircrafts’ transponders, which emit a constant identification and status signal to air traffic control, were switched off on all the flights after hijacking (flight 175’s transponder could not be switched off, but its code was changed repeatedly to prevent proper identification) – an unusual action for hijackers to take since radar would still track the planes anyway.

There was a huge amount of confusion on the morning of 9/11 regarding where, in particular, flight 175 had gone. It was first reported that flight 77 (which allegedly hit the Pentagon) had hit the south tower, and at 11:17am, over two hours after the second attack, United Airlines was still “deeply concerned” about the missing flight 175. A message from the FAA to the White House gave the wrong flight numbers as hijacked. In the light of this confusion and with no clear indication of how it was eventually resolved (since there were no transponder codes to identify the crafts), the FBI’s assertion that the identities of the planes were “never in question” is ludicrous.

Ludicrous, too, is the claim that on four aircraft, without fail or delay, groups of just four or five hijackers, none of them particularly big men, managed to dodge flight crews of up to nine attendants, storm cockpits, overpower pilots and gain control of planes wielding only small knives with one-inch blades, within just a few minutes each, even after airlines warned that hijacking was an imminent danger. Pilots were trained to transmit a universal hijack code at the first sign of trouble – a four-key code that takes just two or three seconds to enter – but somehow not one of the four did. Charles Burlingame, pilot of flight 77, was a tough guy who had spent eight years as a fighter pilot, 17 years in the Naval Reserve, had been part of an anti-terrorism unit at the Pentagon and was still an active sportsman and weightlifter. There were also eight ex-servicemen of the army, navy and air force on the plane. Yet on their 45-minute flight to the plane’s alleged target, and knowing the World Trade Center had been struck by two planes, we are to believe they did nothing. On flight 93, Captain Jason Dahl and flight attendant Deborah Welsh routinely kept the cockpit door locked and established a code-word and secret door-knock, which changed each trip, to alert the cockpit in case of hijacking (Jere Longman, ‘Among the Heroes’, p8-9). The cockpit door was forceable in case of emergency, but it would have been impossible to surprise the pilot, and one must wonder, if the hijackers had to force the door to get in, how the passengers (again, not short of fit athletic types) struggled for around six minutes to gain access themselves and did not succeed (as evident in the cockpit voice recording).

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